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1 Introduction
In most economies, a wide range of industrial policy measures are in use. To assess the allocation and
welfare effects of such policies has been a major concern among economists, who frequently rely on
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. In spite of their obvious advantages, CGE studies of
industrial policy have some drawbacks, too. First, to produce interesting results, a CGE model has to
be rather disaggregated, forcing the model builder to identify a large number of substitution
parameters important for the determination of allocation effects. The estimates of such parameters are
often poor. Second, large scale CGE models are costly to construct. Third, in international
comparisons of industrial policy, such as within the OECD, it is unlikely that one may agree upon a
unified CGE framework. Given these drawbacks, it may be fruitful to provide information about the
allocation effects of industrial policy by means of less sophisticated measures. One alternative, which
I will concentrate on in this paper, is to develop indicators of government assistance. That is, from
theoretical foundations, to construct summary measures of how a wide range of industrial policy
measures affect resource allocation. An indicator should transform various policy measures so that
they can be compared and added together, with weights corresponding to their allocation effects. An
indicator is not intended to give accurate predictions of the allocation effects of government policy,
but rather to give qualitative indications. To justify this loss of accuracy, an indicator should be
simple to calculate, requiring knowledge of only a small set of parameters.
Existing indicators designed to measure the allocative or welfare effects of government policies, such
as the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI), see Anderson, Bannister and Neary (1995) and the Effective
Rates of Assistance (ERA) indicator, see Corden (1966) or Holmoy and Hmgeland (1995), are all
based on the small open economy assumptions - constant returns to scale, homogeneous products and
exogenous world prices. Such assumptions are restrictive but convenient, since they facilitate a
separation of the demand and supply side of the economy. This separability implies that resource
allocation is determined independently of the structure of demand, and thus greatly simplifies the
construction of indicators. During the last two decades, the «new theory of international trade» has
emerged as a complement to differences in technology and factor endowments in explaining resource
allocation and international trade. The innovations of the new theory rest on the idea that there exist
industries producing differentiated products, that in every country there is demand for a wide range of
varieties of each product, and that varieties are produced by means of a technology with increasing
returns to scale. A pioneering reference is Krugman (1979), who developed a one-industry model
with increasing returns and monopolistic competition able to explain intra-industry trade. Helpman
(1981) provided a generalisation of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory, including industries with
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increasing returns and monopolistic competition. Common to most of the theoretical multi-industry
models of international trade and resource allocation within this «new» framework, is that there is one
homogeneous goods industry and one industry producing differentiated varieties. The model
presented in this paper is in part inspired by Flam and Helpman (1987), who also studied the effects
of industrial policy under monopolistic competition. However, there are several important
differences. While Ham and Helpmans model contained only one differentiated goods industry and
one homogeneous goods industry, the model presented here contains several differentiated goods
industries in addition to an industry producing homogeneous capital associated with the firms' fixed
costs. Moreover, Ham and Helpman associated the fixed costs with product development, while the
fixed costs in this model come from plant investments that are independent of the level of production.
In Flam and Helpmans model, no varieties are invented ex ante, while I assume that there is an
infinite number of producable varieties and no development costs. Due to the assumption regarding
what constitutes fixed costs, it is irrelevant whether varieties are «new» or «old», since all firms
within an industry incur the same fixed costs. Within this framework, I study the effects of tariffs,
export subsidies, commodity taxes, production subsidies and commodity taxes and subsidies on
capital equipment. It is shown that it is possible to derive a consistent indicator of the allocation
effects of industrial policy, which also accounts for general equilibrium effects. In order to apply the
indicator empirically, knowledge of only a small set of parameters is required.
Section 2 of this paper presents the theoretical framework. In section 3 the industrial policy indicator
is developed. In the case of two consumption goods industries and two primary factors it is shown
that, when income effects are ignored, there exists a monotonic relation between changes in the
appropriate policy indicator and the relative changes of aggregate industry production. Several special
cases are considered, and it is shown e.g. that the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model - and
hence a simple form of the ERA indicator - appears as a limiting case of the model. In section 4 the
results of some tentative indicator calculations of Norwegian industrial policy are presented and
briefly discussed. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Framework
The available consumption goods can be naturally divided into n different groups, called products.
The varieties of each product share some common characteristics, but are viewed as heterogeneous.
The utility function of a representative individual has the form:
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The ui's are the subutility levels from consumption of varieties of the different products. The
subutility functions, as introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), have constant elasticities of
substitution. We distinguish between varieties of domestic and foreign origin.
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ai is the available number of domestically produced varieties, while b i is the number of imported
varieties. dihi is demand for variety j of the domestically produced varieties of product i, while d ifg is
the corresponding for imported varieties. a1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of
product i, and is assumed to be greater than 1 for all i. This structure of preferences yields the
following demand functions:
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p is the producer price, ti is the tariff rate, v i is the commodity tax rate and e i is the export subsidy rate.
E denotes consumer expenditure. Asterisks denote magnitudes relating to the foreign market. Hence,
d i*hi is demand abroad for the domestically produced variety j of product i.
In the following discussion, firms producing varieties of the same product will be regarded as an
industry. Thus there are n final goods industries. We assume that there exists an infinite number of
producable varieties of each product. There are no development costs, and hence no cost advantages
of imitation. There are no differences in costs of producing different varieties of a product. With the
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symmetric structure of preferences described above, a profit-maximising firm considering entry will
choose a variety that is not manufactured by other firms. The producers incur fixed costs from capital
equipment necessary for production. If a firm closes down, the capital equipment may be sold. Once
installed, the service flow from the capital equipment can be varied costlessly. It is assumed that these
services are not a factor of substitution, but vary proportionally with the level of production. When all
production factors may be varied, the technology is assumed to be linearly homogeneous. Since one
of the factors (capital services) is free on the margin, this implies decreasing average costs. The firms
within an industry are assumed to be homogeneous with respect to productivity. (Holm)), (1996)
discusses the properties of a similar model when firms differ in productivity.) To be able to derive an
indicator, intermediate inputs must be disregarded. This has the obvious consequence that the
indicator will not capture effects via price changes of intermediates, but on the other hand, inclusion
of intermediates into this framework would make the construction of an indicator impossible. The
profit maximisation problem of a representative firm is:
(6) it i = maxp i x i (p i ) — Tl i p ic (1 + v iK )Ki ci (w) x i (p i ) i =1„nf
Pi 1 si
where w is a vector of factor prices, Il i is the per krone user cost of capital equipment, pl( is the net-of-
tax price per unit of capital equipment and v iK is the industry-specific tax on capital equipment
purchases. K i is the (industry-specific) capital equipment requirement per firm.
We assume that there are many active firms (available varieties) within each industry, so that the
own-price elasticity of demand is close to -a 1 . As is common in the literature, producers are assumed
to ignore the effect of their own price on the price index. This gives the following pricing rule:
(a i 	 c i (w)
i	 1+ s i
(7) P. = i =1„n
Since both variable costs and the elasticity of substitution are equal for all varieties within a
commodity group, all domestically produced varieties within a commodity group have the same price
and are manufactured in the same quantity. The equilibrium level of production is:
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We assume free entry and exit of firms. Entry-exit equilibrium implies zero profits in all firms. The
model then corresponds to what is known as «Chamberlins Large Group Case» (cf. Chamberlin
(1933)). It is assumed that the entry-exit equilibrium is stable, i.e. entry of firms causes declining
profits per firm. The zero profit condition implies:
v iK )ki (1+ S i )(9) x i = 	 (ai -1)
c i (w)
Aggregate industry production is defined as:
(10) X i = a ix i
New capital equipment is produced by the construction industry at constant unit costs, -6-K (w)
Capital equipment is assumed to be homogeneous between industries. This means that it can be
reallocated from one industry to another without any adjustment or installation costs. An entering
firm may buy its capital equipment either from a firm closing down in another industry or from the
construction industry. The construction industry will only be active as long as the cost of producing
one unit of capital equipment does not exceed the price, that is -5K (W) pK . When all differentiated
products industries are in entry-exit equilibrium, the construction sector is active, but is only
supplying the need for replacement investments. We assume that this production requires only a
negligible fraction of the available primary factors. A similar assumption is made by Gavin (1990).
Letting sK denote subsidies on capital equipment, competition in the construction industry is assumed
to ensure:
(11) Zic(w) = pK
l+sK
In the reasoning above, it is assumed that capital equipment is a homogeneous good. It would
probably be more realistic to regard capital equipment as industry specific, but rebuildable. This is
discussed within a HOS-type model by Mussa (1978), where a rebuilding industry is adjusting
«second-hanth capital equipment from one industry for use in other industries. Increasing marginal
costs in the rebuilding industry slows the reallocation of capital, but the stationary equilibrium is the
same as if such rebuilding costs were absent.
The equilibrium conditions in the factor markets complete the model:
(12) Vi =	 a i x ic ii (w) , 1=1,...,k
i=i
V, is the available quantity of factor 1, while c i,(w) is the unit demand for factor 1 in industry i.
Aggregate consumer expenditure, E, is equal to total factor remuneration plus net government
transfers. We assume that government transfers are adjusted endogenously, such that consumer
expenditure is constant. This implies that neither the government budget nor trade necessarily is
balanced. Neglecting income effects is done in order to simplify the analysis, thereby focusing on
direct allocation effects only. The model consists of (7), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12), which are
4n+k-1-1 equations determining xi, pi, ai, Xi, w1 and pK.
What formally distinguishes this model from the traditional HOS model, is the existence of fixed
costs and that the elasticities of demand take on finite values. From (7) and (8), note that x i can be
expressed as a function of w and a i ( x i =fi (a i , w)). (9) and (12) may then be written:
1 C ; (W)
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In the HOS model, factor prices are determined recursively in a system of equations similar to (9').
Production in each industry then follows from the factor market equilibrium conditions. In this model,
however, it is somewhat more complicated. Because of the existence of fixed costs, the number of
firms is important, while it is indeterminate and without any interest in the HOS model. Since the
number of firms appears in (9'), the recursivity between factor prices and production is lost.
3 An indicator of industrial policy
In this section the effects of the specified industrial policy measures are derived. The reference point
is a situation where no policy measures are active. We define an industrial policy variable, which is
shown to be a relevant indicator of the effects of government assistance on resource allocation the
different measures contained in this model when considering a case with two primary factors and two
industries in addition to the construction industry (denoted as the <42+1)x2»-case). Since we are
primarily interested in resource allocation, the effects on the number of varieties (firms) within each
industry and production per firm are not presented, thus neglecting welfare considerations.
Define:
x. 
	aiPixe
	i 
	, domestic producers' share of total production in industry i.
oc iE +
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Letting s denote (l+s) and 5i denote relative change in x, differentiation of (8) yields:
(13) X i = [—a i + 8HCa i — 1) pi --era, —	 + R1 —	 (a i —9H (a i —	 + x (1 —8H)(a i --1)ti
The coefficient for 13 i is the pari passu own-price elasticity of demand, i.e. when all domestic
producers change their prices simultaneously. The second term reflects that a relative change in the
number of domestic firms will have greater impact on demand for a specific variety the larger the
share of domestic production. Commodity taxation reduces demand proportionally to the relative size
of the domestic market, as captured by the third term. The coefficients for export subsidies and tariffs
are the pari passu own-price and cross-price elasticities respectively, weighted with market shares.
Differentiation of the pricing equation (7) yields:
(14)p i
	1,....,n
1.1
where 6i1 = Cii (W)W I Ci (W), production factor l's share of variable costs in industry i. After some
rearrangements, differentiation of the zero-profit condition (10) yields:
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From the factor market equilibrium conditions one gets:
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where Ali =cilaixi ly is the share of factor 1 that is employed in industry i. et is a vector of
conditional demand elasticities for factor 1 in industry i with respect to factor prices. Inserting (14) in
(13) using (7):
(17) 6*, - ( 1 —er)a,= [-a, +0 11 (a ; -1)}(10„W,	 +[(1-0}1)(a,	 +4),H(1 -
1=1
(a1 - 1)ii
From (15) and (9), one can find an expression for a i , which in turn is inserted in (17). Rearrangement
gives:
(18) e i X i +H	 ((ai 1X1 - + O il+ OKI
 1 - 	, = 1„n11
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where I■T i is an industrial policy variable:
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As seen from (18), 1■1 . i represents all partial equilibrium effects on aggregate industry production of
the policy measures considered in this study. The weights of the different measures in N ; are
dependent on the size of the elasticity of substitution, domestic producers' share of total production
and the domestic market's share of total demand. The coefficient for production subsidies is equal to
the absolute value of the pan passu own-price elasticity of demand minus the term (1- Or ) . This
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term comes from the zero-profit condition. Subsidies increase production per firm in partial
equilibrium, whereas tariffs, export subsidies and commodity taxes do not appear in the zero profit
condition. Therefore optimal production per firm does not change (in partial equilibrium) due to
changes in these policy parameters. Changes in aggregate industry production take place through
entry or exit of firms. The coefficient in the export subsidies' term is equal to the pan passu own-price
elasticity of demand times the initial export share of domestic production, while the coefficient in the
tariff term is equal to the pari-passu cross-price elasticity times the home market share of demand.
Subsidies and taxes on capital appear in the last term of the industrial policy variable. Subsidies to
capital induce entry and reduce equilibrium production per firm. The effect is larger the smaller the
initial domestic share of production. This is because a new entrant reduces the demand towards all
existing firms, both domestic and foreign, within the industry. When the initial domestic share of
production is small, a new domestic firm captures more demand from foreign than domestic firms,
thereby increasing domestic aggregate industry production, everything else given.
We will now investigate, in the «(2+ 1)x2»-case, whether St i is a relevant indicator of allocation
effects of government policy measures when general equilibrium interactions through factor prices
are taken into consideration. Rearranging (16) gives the following expressions
(19a) X 1 = 7 1 (W 1 — W 2 )
(19b)X 2 = 1(W 2(W  — )
where
= 12E21 + X22E 1
Aill  X21
X21 E 12 + 11e21 
Y2 —
X11 — X21
E	 El + E2 are the average cross-price conditional elasticities, which are both non-negativeef	 el ef	 e2 ef
in a two-factor system. Thus, the numerators in yi and y2 reflect the aggregate substitution
possibilities in the economy. Ordering the industries so that industry 1 is relatively intensive in the
use of factor 1, the y's are non-negative, and strictly positive as long as there are any substitution
possibilities between the two primary factors in at least one industry. (19a) and (19b) shows that the
link between relative factor prices and total production in the respective industries is essentially the
same in this model as in the traditional HOS model: If the price of a primary factor increases, the
11
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industry that employs this factor most intensively expands its aggregate production. The other
industry contracts. The reallocations are larger the greater the substitution possibilities between the
primary factors. However, a major difference from the HOS model is that the factor prices are
determined simultaneously with the level of production.
It remains to investigate the relation between changes in the industrial policy variable and changes in
relative factor prices. In the «(2+1)x2»- case (18) may be written:
(18' a) Orki ÷ (en ((ai — 1X1— Or ) ± er ) + 8K1 (1— eli'l +(912((al — 1X1 — OH, ) + OH, ), + 01(2(1 — er))iv2 :"-""&I
(18' b) O2R2+ (021 ((62 - 1)(1 - 0112 )i +021 +13 K2(1-0 2H ))* 1 + (022((02 - 0(1-6112 1,+02)+0K2(1 - 021)ii2=&1
(18'a), (18'b), (19a) and (19b) are four independent equations determining W i , W 2 , k i and 5C 2 as
functions of 1:T 1 and N . After some rearrangements, (19a) and (19b) inserted in (18'a) and (18'b)
respectively yield:
ell ((al -1X1 - Or) + Or(	 OH	 )-F 0 1(1 (1 - 0 11 ) 1 °1201 - 1 X1 -el ) +811 ) +9K2 (1 -el) OH	 ,,,, 4, - 101 iz(20) y i +	 W1 	 i.1r vv 2	 H 11
The determinant of the equation system (20) and (21) is equal to:
where
A=(011 0 21 )((a l —1)(1— 911 ) + 011(62 —1X1— 0 121 ) + 0 121 ) (On - *011 - 0(1 -	 + 0 131 -
+ (0 22
 - 01(2)02 1)(1 - 0 121 ) + 0 121 X1 0 11 )
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Both the first two terms of the determinant are strictly positive, provided there are substitution
possibilities in at least one industry. It remains to investigate the sign of A. Given the assumptions
about factor intensities made earlier, the first term in the above expression is positive. One of the last
two terms may be negative, however. This will be the case if the factor intensities in the capital
equipment industry are «extreme», so that either O n < O K' or e22 < 8 K2 . (Note that both inequalities
cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. If this was the case, then e n + 822 < 1, which is impossible.) The
following is based on the additional assumption that the factor intensities in the construction industry
are «between» those in the differentiated goods industries. Then A and hence the determinant are
unambiguously positive. Solving (20) and (21) for the change in relative factor prices yields:
(22) W i — (a2 -0 121 (01 2 — 1))& i —	 - 8H (a, -1))1CT 2
Y (a2 - 0 }21 (a2 - +1'20 }21 (a, —0 1,i(cy, —0)+A
Recalling that the absolute value of the pari passu own-price elasticity of demand is equal to
cio ai Vg 1) , (22) may be written:
'&1/eio _ & 2/8 (2)
8K1X1 — (3 211 VE°2 (e22 — 8K2 )(1 914 )/E°1/E01 720}: /E(2) (en '21 \
(22') together with (19) show that N i , when divided with the true own-price elasticity of demand, is
a relevant indicator of resource allocation effects of the government industrial policy measures
considered in this study, when also general equilibrium effects through factor markets are considered.
St i represents the shift in the demand curve equivalent to the implemented policy measures. The
magnitude of the effect on relative factor prices from changes in the industrial policy variables
depends on both demand elasticities, substitution possibilities in production and relative factor
intensities. (22') may be regarded as a generalisation of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem for small,
open economies in the case with downward sloping demand curves and fixed costs. In the HOS
model, shifts in the exogenous price, i.e. shifts in the horizontal demand curves, play the same role as
N i (22'). If varieties of the different products are regarded as homogeneous, then a l
 and 02 take on
infinite values. If there are no fixed costs, OK, and e. are zero. If a i and 02 approach infinity, and OK,
and O. approach zero, after some rearrangements (22') becomes:
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The term Orl i + (1— O iH )ti + ti is the equivalent price subsidy when each firm faces a horizontal
demand curve. In the basic model, firms have the same market shares on both the home market and
the export markets. The relative distribution of sales - in a situation with no government intervention -
will be equal to total demand shares. This is why tariffs and export subsidies in (22') are weighted
with these demand shares, reflecting the importance of home market demand and export market
demand. However, when firms face given prices on all markets, the only way to avoid arbitrage
(reexports or reimports) is to have e i = ti . Then (22') may be written:
(22" )1im	 = (il +K1) (i2 -142)
This is exactly the same result as in the original HOS model, and shows that the Stolper-Samuelson
result appears as a limiting case of (22'). It shows that commodity taxes are irrelevant for the
determination of factor prices and production levels when varieties of a product are regarded as
perfect substitutes. Each firm faces horizontal demand curves with prices given from the world
market, at least when the economy in question is sufficiently small. This implies that the demand and
supply side are «separable», hence commodity taxation that does not discriminate between domestic
and foreign varieties, is irrelevant for resource allocation.
To explore the model further, it is useful to consider two additional special cases of (22'). When
ex and approach 1, this is equivalent to a closed economy. It is easily seen that in this case (22')
reduces to:
.371)	 V2) 
Yi +12 + e ll — °21
Naturally, tariffs and export subsidies are irrelevant for relative factor prices and hence industry
production levels in a closed economy. We also note that subsidies and taxes on capital equipment
have no consequences for aggregate industry production. They may of course have consequences for
the number of firms and production per firm within an industry, but new entrants will only steal
ell —d 21
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customers from existing domestic firms, and since total demand is given, aggregate industry
production is unaffected.
When Or and ci approach 0, we have the case of an «extremely» small and open economy, where the
home market represents a negligible fraction of total demand, and domestic production represents an
insignificant share of world production. Equation (22) becomes:
02 (al -1A +01 -f- tK - --K1)- (51102 -1)§2 4- a2t2 + k --7%7K2
cell - 821/\61 - 0(02 -1/+\811 Eki„al - 4- (022 -0K2
Subsidies and taxes on capital equipment are in this special case important for the determination of
relative factor prices and hence for industry production. Whereas the importance of export subsidies
is significantly enhanced, tariffs and commodity taxation are no longer important, due to the
insignificance of the home market. It is important to note that substitution possibilities in production
do not influence the effects on factor prices, as they do in the general case and in the case of a closed
economy.
4 Empirical illustration: The case of Norway
The main result of the previous section was to show that 1■VE1) is an indicator of the allocation
effects of industrial policy, in an economy with a structure as described in section 2. In addition to
being a measure of effective assistance, the indicator also reveals what policy measures that are the
most important in different industries. Contrasted to a CGE model analysis, an evaluation of
industrial policy based on the indicator has much smaller informational requirements. Besides policy
parameters, using the indicator requires knowledge of only three sets of parameters: Home market
shares of total demand (e), domestic producers' share of total supply ( Or) and the elasticity of
substitution between varieties of a product (0). In this section, indicator calculations for 17
Norwegian industries, based on data from 1989, are presented. The policy variables considered are
production subsidies, commodity taxation, and import protection. The calculations presented here do
not pretend to be more than an illustration.
The calculations of net subsidy rates and commodity tax rates were made as a result of a detailed
examination of government budgets and the national accounts. A comprehensive list of the specific
subsidies and indirect taxes considered may be found in Hmgeland (1994). The estimates of
equivalent tariff rates (the protection due to both tariff and non-tariff barriers), are documented in
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Fmhn (1996). The main data source for both the estimation of parameters and the calculation of policy
variables is the Norwegian National Accounts. The elasticities of substitution (a 1) are estimated
through calculated markups on marginal costs, cf. equation (7), where buildings and constructions are
viewed as fixed costs in all industries. Domestic producers' share of total production, r , is set to 0
for industries potentially exposed to international competition and equal to 1 for naturally sheltered
industries. This will in general be correct if one assumes that the whole world is the relevant market
for all exposed industries. Naturally, the relevance of this assumption may vary between industries.
CI
 is set equal to the share of domestic production in an industry delivered to the home market in
1989. Ideally, Or should be set equal to (the unobservable) share of home market deliveries in a
situation with no active government measures. There is reason to believe that the observed shares
may deviate from the «correct» but unobservable shares. However, sensitivity calculations not
reported here show that the order of the indicator is not substantially affected by reasonable variations
in (I) .
The parameter estimates, the magnitudes of the policy variables and the calculated indicators are all
reported in Table 1. Comparing the magnitudes of the policy variables and their respective
contributions to the indicator (both with respect to different measures within an industry and a
specific measure caress industries), clearly reveals that the relative importance of the policy measures
cannot be correctly inferred from studying the magnitudes of the policy variable alone. Agriculture
stands out as the by far most assisted industry, benefiting greatly from both subsidies and import
protection. Manufacture of Consumption Goods is also heavily assisted. This is due to protection
through non-tariff barriers on processed food and textiles. Also Fishing and Breeding of Fish and
Forest?), appear to be considerably assisted compared to the rest of the industries. Note that the
naturally sheltered industries are effectively taxed by the policy measures considered here. Another
important observation is that for most of the industries net subsidies have the largest impact on the
indicator. The calculations show that commodity taxation is of minor importance for allocation
effects of industrial policy in Norway. This is mainly due to the fact that the estimated elasticities of
substitution are quite large, cf. the discussion in section 3 of what happens when a ---> 00 . As
discussed in section 2, the indicator does not capture effects via price changes of intermediate inputs
due to industrial policy. The results reported in Holmoy and Hwgeland (1995) indicate that the first-
order effect of changes in prices of intermediate inputs would be largest in Agriculture and
Manufacture of Consumption Goods, but that it would not significantly change the picture from the
calculations reported in Table 1.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, a theory-consistent indicator of the allocation effects of industrial policy under
monopolistic competition, translating policy shifts into equivalent demand curve shifts, has been
proposed. The indicator is a summary measure of industrial policy.. It also shows the relative
importance of different policy measures. The major advantage of the «indicator approach>> is that
once a relevant indicator is constructed, it is relatively easy to draw a qualitative picture of how
industrial policy affects resource allocation. As opposed to a CGE model, using the indicator requires
knowledge of only a small set of parameters. Although less sophisticated, the transparency and small
informational requirements of the indicator suggest that it may serve as an efficient alternative to
numerical general equilibrium models, especially in matters of international comparisons of industrial
policy.
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